Lahore, November 2025 — Pakistan’s Bureau of Aircraft Safety Investigation Pakistan (BASIP) has released its final investigation report on Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) Flight PK-150, revealing how a chain of cockpit errors and air-traffic control hesitation led an Airbus A320 to land on the wrong runway at Lahore during dense fog on 17 January 2025.
The report, published on 4 November 2025, confirms that the aircraft, cleared for Runway 36R, instead carried out a CAT III-B autoland on Runway 36L, which has only CAT I ILS capability. Investigators cited a serious procedural breach and a loss of situational awareness that eroded the cockpit’s built-in checks and balances.
A Chain of Errors
PK-150, operating from Dammam to Multan, was diverted to Lahore due to poor weather. Lahore itself was under dense fog, with Low Visibility Procedures (LVP) in force.
The aircraft was cleared for Instrument Landing System (ILS) Approach (CAT-III) Runway 36R. The A320 crew correctly briefed and communicated an approach to Runway 36R but mistakenly entered the ILS frequency for 36L (109.7 MHz) into the Flight Management System instead of 36R’s 110.3 MHz.
That single error went undetected throughout descent and final approach. Both pilots failed to cross-check the ILS frequency during descent, approach, and landing checks, and did not recognize the mismatch (36L instead of 36R) from the cues available on the Flight Management System (FMS), Primary Flight Display (PFD), and Navigation Display (ND).
Despite the incorrect tuning, the aircraft continued its automatic descent, believing it was following 36R’s ILS beam. In reality, it was tracking 36L’s weaker CAT I signal which is unsuitable for autoland operations in near-zero visibility.
On radar, approach controllers noticed the aircraft drifting west of the 36R localizer. The tower, too, was aware that the alignment appeared off. Yet no one instructed a go-around. Instead, the tower controllers switched on the approach lights for Runway 36L to facilitate landing.
The aircraft touched down far left of the 36L centerline, leaving barely 15 feet from the runway edge. The pilots only realized their mistake during the landing roll.
Complacency in the Cockpit
What happened on the day makes for a case study of human factors in aviation.
Both pilots displayed a complete loss of situational awareness. They not only failed to conduct proper checks but also failed to identify cues from flight instruments and ATC communication.
The report paints a troubling picture of cockpit conduct: Lack of standard phraseology during critical phases of flight, lack of role clarity, inadequate briefings, and failure to cross check ILS frequencies – what the report called, “an elementary CRM procedure.”
Investigators wrote:
It was difficult to identify who is Pilot Flying (PF) or Pilot Monitoring (PM). A clear violation of standard communication and PF & PM task-sharing procedures due to relaxed cockpit environment.
All of the above erase the safety net that standard operating procedures are designed to provide.
To add to the procedural lapses, the pilot monitoring (PM) was repeatedly inattentive and there appeared to be competency and training issues as well.
PM was lagging and was not attentive as number of times, PF had to guide and assist him to view at right place and correct data feeding. This speaks of poor knowledge level of PM.
Fear and Hesitation in the Control Tower
The air-traffic side was equally troubling. Controllers later told investigators they feared reprimand for issuing a go-around if it turned out to be unnecessary.
“Despite misalignment, both ATCOs were hesitant to give ‘Go-Around’ due to fear of punitive actions from their supervisors, reflecting a toxic safety culture,” the report says.
This culture of fear influenced decision-making at a critical moment, with both approach and tower controllers opting for silence instead of safety intervention.
A Near Miss That Exposed Systemic Flaws
The BASIP issued multiple recommendations to PIA, Pakistan Air Navigation Services, and the Civil Aviation Authority, targeting crew training on procedural compliance, controller empowerment, and the need for independent ILS control on Lahore’s parallel runways.
No lives were lost, but the PK-150 incident offers a stark reminder of how complacency, confusion, and fear can override technology. The aircraft landed just 15 feet from the edge of the runway – a margin so small that, in the investigators’ words, “any deviation could have been catastrophic”
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